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a b s t r a c t
In this paper, we investigate the consequences of using outcome-based versus ex ante-based cost-sharing
mechanisms in terms of competing ﬁrms' proﬁtability and total welfare. We consider two ﬁrms making a
joint expenditure, which can positively affect ﬁrms' demand and/or unit operating costs, while com-
peting in the ﬁnal market by setting either price or quantity. We compare two outcome-based cost-
sharing mechanisms, i.e., Quantity Proportional (QP) and Total Margin proportional (TM), with the more
competitive Fixed Share (FS) mechanism where cost-sharing is set up on an ex ante basis. We show that
outcome-based mechanisms, and even a fully collusive behavior induced by the optimal cost-sharing
mechanism, might actually enhance total welfare as compared with the more competitive FS mechanism.
We also ﬁnd that, although the FS mechanism is never more preferable than the TM mechanism, it can
lead to higher proﬁts than the QP mechanism when competition is mild. These results can support ﬁrms
cooperating with competitors in the choice of the cost-sharing mechanism as well as provide important
implications to policy makers.
& 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Cooperation among competitors can take the most disparate
forms, such as alliances, consortia, cooperatives, joint production,
marketing or R&D agreements, across the most disparate in-
dustries, e.g., aerospace, agri-food, automotive, ﬁnancial, IT and
electronics, pharmaceutical, and retail (Hansmann, 1996; Rochet
and Tirole, 2002; Akcay and Tan, 2008; Rodriguez Monroy and
Vilana Arto, 2010; Chen and Roma, 2011; Ghosh and Morita, 2012;
Lo Nigro et al., 2013; Tomlinson and Fai, 2013).
In this context, one important, yet understudied, question re-
lates to the proﬁt and welfare implications of different mechan-
isms that competing ﬁrms may use to share joint expenditures or
investments. Cost sharing is indeed one of the most common
reasons behind ﬁrms' cooperation (Cassiman and Veugelers,
2002). Real examples suggest that cost sharing is usually set up on
an ex ante basis in many R&D joint ventures. Consider, for in-
stance, ﬁrms investing in a joint venture to develop a new tech-
nology, and then competing independently in the product market.
In these cases, ﬁrms often decide the shares of the joint invest-
ment before they engage in market competition and do not allow
any ex post adjustment based on market outcomes such as
margins or sales. For instance, the contribution to the R&D in-
vestment was set up on an ex ante ﬁxed basis for the R&D
agreement between Sony and Samsung to develop new LCD
technology (Gnyawali and Park, 2011). The ex ante ﬁxed sharing
rule is also utilized by the Blu-ray Disc Association, i.e., the R&D
consortium consisting of all major consumer electronics manu-
facturers that developed the Blu-ray technology (Blu-ray Disc As-
sociation, 2015). Similarly, product design and other R&D costs for
memory technologies are split based on a ﬁxed share by Intel and
Micron in their joint venture IM Flash Technologies (Micron, 2014).
In some other cases, ﬁrms might leave room for ex post adjust-
ments or entirely base the joint expenditure allocation on market
outcomes. The latter situations may arise in case of stable research
consortia. For instance, R&D activities of Sematech, the worldwide
R&D consortium of semi-conductor manufacturers, have been ﬁ-
nanced through members' contributions proportionally to their sales
(Katz et al., 1990). Similarly, in the joint production alliance between
car manufacturers PSA and Toyota, the capital expenses related to the
common plant are divided proportionally to the production output of
the two companies (ATZ online, 2004). Outcome-based allocation
mechanisms are even more popular in agri-food and retail co-
operatives/consortia, where ﬁrms cooperate for certain activities but
still compete in the product market (Albaek and Schultz, 1997). The
US Department of Agriculture explains that manufacturing and
marketing operations are usually ﬁnanced by cooperatives' members
through mechanisms, such as patronage refunds or per-unit retains,
which are indeed outcome-based mechanisms (US Department of
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Agriculture, 1994). For instance, big dairy cooperatives such as Land
O'Lakes or Dairy Farmers of America adopt such mechanisms
(Chaddad and Cook, 2004). In Europe, numerous cooperatives and
consortia utilize allocation schemes based on ﬁrms' output (in
quantity or in value) to share costs of their regular activities of pro-
duction quality control and product promotion. Examples include
Arla Foods, a Denmark-based dairy cooperative with operations
worldwide (Arla Foods, 2015). Furthermore, outcome-based me-
chanisms are utilized to ﬁnance retail cooperatives and buying
groups. For instance, Spar, one of the largest retail co-ops worldwide,
explains that all joint marketing and supply chain management ac-
tivities are ﬁnanced through members' contributions based on their
sales (Spar, 2015). In these cooperative settings, the entity established
to manage the cooperation (e.g., cooperative, consortium or category
association) is usually responsible for joint expenditures, such as
quality assurance programs or generic advertising campaigns. How-
ever, members still remain competitors in the ﬁnal market, and thus
choose the price of their products or the relative level of output in-
dependently (Crespi and Marette, 2002). In this case, members' an-
nual contributions to ﬁnance the joint activities often depend on
output marketed during the year and adjustments may occur at the
end of the year.
Our study is motivated by the fact that a direct comparison of
ex ante-based vs. outcome-based mechanisms has not been con-
ducted in the extant literature in spite of the highlighted popu-
larity of these mechanisms. In this paper, we ﬁll this gap by in-
vestigating the competitive effects of outcome-based vs. ex ante-
based cost-sharing mechanisms in a variety of economic settings.
This allows us to understand how different cost-sharing me-
chanisms shape ﬁrms' operational (price or quantities) and co-
operative (joint expenditure) decisions and thus inﬂuence their
proﬁtability. At the same time, it allows us to shed light on their
economic viability in terms of total welfare. Hence, our analysis
helps increase ﬁrms' understanding about the role of outcome-
based vs. ex ante-based cost-sharing mechanisms, and thus pro-
vide a better support for their decisions of cooperation with
competitors. Moreover, our analysis offers a more complete view
in terms of policy by shedding light on the reasonableness of the
conventional argument provided by previous literature (Grossman
and Shapiro, 1986; Katz, 1986; Katz et al., 1990) that outcome-
based mechanisms have a negative inﬂuence on total welfare.1
We model a game where two identical ﬁrms cooperate by sharing
a joint expenditure, which can positively affect ﬁrms' demand and/or
unit operating costs. For instance, cooperation can be in the form of
production, marketing, and/or R&D expenditures. Still, ﬁrms compete
with each other in the ﬁnal market deciding upon a competitive
variable independently. The competitive variable can be either the
price or the quantity. Therefore, ﬁrms face a Bertrand competition or a
Cournot competition, respectively. We model ﬁrms' cooperative and
competitive decisions under both one-stage and two-stage games. In
the ﬁrst case, all decisions are made simultaneously. Speciﬁcally, the
entity established by the ﬁrms to manage the cooperation (e.g., con-
sortium, cooperative, joint venture) is responsible for choosing the
level of the joint expenditure, whereas ﬁrms independently set their
own prices or quantities. In the second case, the decisions are se-
quential. In other words, the joint expenditure is chosen ﬁrst, and
ﬁrms compete in setting prices or quantities in the second stage. We
initially develop the analysis under the one-stage game as it is ana-
lytically tractable. Afterwards, we extend the study to a two-stage
game with the support of both analytical derivation and numerical
analysis and show that the key messages of the paper still hold.2
We compare proﬁt and welfare implications of using two out-
come-based mechanisms, namely Quantity Proportional (QP) and
Total Margin proportional (TM), versus a mechanism where the joint
expenditure is allocated to ﬁrms on an ex ante basis, which we refer
to as Fixed Share (FS). As discussed above, both types of mechanisms
are common in a wide range of business settings. The FS mechanism
reﬂects the case where the joint expenditure is split based on bar-
gaining before ﬁrms engage in market competition and ﬁrms' shares
are never changed. Several studies have considered a ﬁxed share
mechanism for sharing joint costs of R&D projects (Katz, 1986;
Aloysius and Rosenthal, 1999). In contrast, under the QP and TM
mechanisms joint expenditures are allocated to ﬁrms based on the
marketed output and realized proﬁt margins, respectively. Food
processing and retail cooperatives are examples of cooperation
where these mechanisms are popular (US Department of Agriculture,
1994; Spar, 2015). Also, the logic of QP and TM mechanisms closely
reﬂects that of stable R&D or manufacturing collaborations (Gross-
man and Shapiro, 1986; ATZ online, 2004). Particularly, the TM me-
chanism can be implemented in R&D joint ventures when there are
no big issues of observability among partners (Lambertini et al.,
2008). Finally, we also derive the optimal cost-sharing mechanism, i.
e., the mechanism that maximizes ﬁrms' total proﬁt, which is itself
an outcome-based mechanism, and compare it with the FS me-
chanism in terms of total welfare.
Our results show that ﬁrms' proﬁts are never the highest under
the FS mechanism. Indeed, this mechanism is always dominated by
the TM mechanism. However, interestingly, under both Bertrand and
Cournot competition, the QP mechanism is the preferable mechan-
ism to ﬁrms in the presence of ﬁerce competition, whereas it can be
dominated by both FS and TM mechanisms when competition is
absent or sufﬁciently mild. Moreover, the ﬁndings about welfare
comparison suggest that outcome-based mechanisms might have
the merit of enhancing the total welfare as compared with a more
competitive mechanism, e.g., the FS mechanism. Under the one-stage
game, this can hold under Bertrand competition and demand-in-
creasing expenditure. The extension to the two-stage game conﬁrms
and further strengthens this result. In this case, the positive effect of
outcome-based mechanisms on welfare can emerge under both
Bertrand and Cournot types of competition, irrespective of whether
the joint expenditure is demand-increasing or cost-reducing. Our
ﬁndings are robust also when extending our model to non-identical
ﬁrms via numerical investigation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
present a literature overview. In Section 3 we set up the model. In
Section 4 we compare the different cost-sharing mechanisms under
the one-stage game. We then analyze the two-stage game in Section
5. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss the implications and conclude.
2. Literature overview
In economics literature, a plethora of studies have shown that
cooperation among competitors might be beneﬁcial to both ﬁrms
1 Note that, in deriving our managerial and policy implications, we consider
total welfare rather than consumer surplus. The potential conﬂict between con-
sumer and society preferences recalls the historical economic debate on the actual
goal of antitrust agencies and the appropriateness of total surplus or consumer
surplus as welfare standards, which has recently been reawakened by numerous
economists (Carlton, 2007). As argued by these researchers, in an economy pur-
suing total welfare maximization, antitrust agencies should focus on total welfare,
leaving to other bodies the task of resolving distributional questions. While an in-
depth analysis of the practical issues tackled in this current debate is beyond the
scope of this paper, it should be clear that, in line with most of the previous lit-
erature on cooperation among competitors (Grossman and Shapiro, 1986; Katz,
1986; d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Katz et al., 1990), we espouse the argu-
ments in favor of total welfare throughout the paper.
2 As explained later in greater detail, we consider both Bertrand and Cournot
types of competition and both one-stage and two-stage games to better reﬂect real
business settings, and thus deliver a more general message.
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and society in a number of economic settings. For instance, several
works focusing on R&D cooperation have shown that partial co-
operation, e.g., R&D cooperation and quantity competition, might be
not only beneﬁcial to ﬁrms, but also to the society, when product
market competition is moderate and/or R&D spillovers are large
(Grossman and Shapiro, 1986; Katz, 1986; d'Aspremont and Jacque-
min, 1988; Katz et al., 1990; Kamien et al., 1992; Motta, 1992). None
of these studies have directly examined the impact of different cost-
sharing mechanisms, i.e., outcome-based vs. on an ex ante basis, on
ﬁrms' proﬁtability and total welfare. Nevertheless, it has been con-
sistently argued that the introduction of sharing mechanisms based
on market outcomes raises ﬁrms' marginal costs. In turn, this tends
to reduce output, thus promoting full collusion and increasing ﬁrms'
proﬁts at the detriment of the society (Grossman and Shapiro, 1986;
Katz, 1986; Katz et al., 1990). In contrast, by performing a comparison
under a variety of economic settings, we show that outcome-based
mechanisms can actually have the merit of enhancing total welfare in
spite of their collusive force.
More recently, several studies in the management science and
operations management literature have analyzed the economic im-
plications of settings where competitors cooperate in certain busi-
ness activities (Banker et al., 1998; Akcay and Tan, 2008; Ge and Hu,
2008; Wu et al., 2008; Chen and Roma, 2011; Zhang and Frazier,
2011; Kumar Jena and Sarmah, 2014; Chen et al., 2015). Zhang (2006)
points out that today's supply chain economy comprises several
supply chains, such as Walmart, Target, and Sears Holdings, which
compete in the same business but also cooperate in material pro-
curement, resource utilization, utility consumption, and distribution
patterns. Most of the studies in this literature shed light on the
conditions under which cooperation is advantageous to competing
ﬁrms under different business settings. Banker et al. (1998) study
whether cooperating in quality decisions is more proﬁtable than full
competition from the perspective of competing ﬁrms. They assume
an ex ante-based mechanism. Chen and Roma (2011) study proﬁt
implications of cooperating with competitors in procurement. Chen
et al. (2015) analyze proﬁtability of cooperative vs. noncooperative
quality investments of two competing manufacturers in presence of a
common supplier. Kumar Jena and Sarmah (2014) examine proﬁts
under different cooperative and competitive settings in a duopoly
closed-loop supply chain. Other studies in this literature have also
investigated the impact of cooperation among competitors on total
welfare. For instance, Wu et al. (2008) have studied cooperation in
the form of information sharing in a Cournot duopoly showing that
such cooperation does not necessarily increase total welfare. How-
ever, none of the above studies have examined the effects of different
cost-sharing mechanisms on ﬁrms' proﬁtability and total welfare.
Very few studies in the management science literature have
compared different cost or proﬁt sharing mechanisms in real co-
operation settings (Aloysius and Rosenthal, 1999; Bhaskaran and
Krishnan, 2009; Meca and Sosic, 2014). Aloysius and Rosenthal
(1999) consider ﬁxed-share mechanism (referred to as constant
share mechanism) and outcome-based mechanisms (referred to as
proportional share mechanisms) for R&D consortia. Bhaskaran and
Krishnan (2009) analyze investment and innovation sharing in
new product development. However, none of these works ex-
plicitly consider competition among ﬁrms. In contrast, the com-
parison of ex ante-based vs. outcome-based types of cost-sharing
mechanisms in the presence of competition is our focus.
3. Model setup
Consider two identical ﬁrms which compete in the same market
with differentiated products, but cooperate by making a joint ex-
penditure in some area of their business, e.g., production, R&D, and
marketing. Competition in the ﬁnal market can be either based on
price or quantity, leading to a Bertrand or Cournot competition, re-
spectively. We consider both types of competition because both can
be observed in real business settings. For instance, for cooperatives
producing commodity inputs, such as livestock, grain, fertilizers,
competition is more likely to be on quantities. This is because these
markets are usually positioned upstream in the supply chain and
prices tend to be determined by matching demand and supply in the
market. In contrast, members of retail cooperatives are more likely to
set and compete on prices because they sell differentiated consumer
products and earn proﬁts from adding mark-ups to wholesale prices.
Similarly, when R&D partnerships are set to develop technologies
that can be used for a large portion of each partner's product port-
folio, competition can be modeled as a Cournot competition. This is
because ﬁrms tend to compete on quantities at the aggregate level
given that production capacity may become stringent (Kreps and
Scheinkman, 1983; Haskel and Martin, 1994). In contrast, if R&D
cooperation focuses on developing technologies for speciﬁc con-
sumer products (for instance, the mentioned case of Sony and
Samsung joint venture on LCD technology, which is utilized mainly
for TVs), the competition can be modeled as a Bertrand game as
ﬁrms usually set prices for single consumer products.
In our model ﬁrms set the competitive variable, price or quantity,
by maximizing their own proﬁt non-cooperatively. The joint ex-
penditure is instead set to maximize the joint proﬁt and split by
ﬁrms based on a selected cost-sharing mechanism. Joint proﬁt
maximization eliminates any free-riding risk when choosing the le-
vel of the joint expenditure (Bass et al., 2005). Let pi and pj be the
prices and ( )= ·q q p p, ,i i i j and ( )= ·q q p p, ,j j j i be the direct demand
functions of Firms i¼1,2 and = −j i3 , respectively. In case of
Cournot competition, we can specify the inverse demand functions
( )= ·p p q q, ,i i i j and ( )= ·p p q q, ,j j j i . Also, let I be the joint ex-
penditure. Depending on its nature, I can positively affect ﬁrms' de-
mand functions ( )=q q p p I, ,i i i j ( ( )=p p q q I, ,i i i j ), ﬁrms' unit oper-
ating costs ( )c Ii , or both, for i¼1,2 and = −j i3 .3 For instance, an
advertising expenditure is likely to have a (positive) effect only on
ﬁrms' demand, while joint maintenance or quality control ex-
penditures help reduce ﬁrms' unit operating costs. A product/process
R&D investment can instead inﬂuence both ﬁrms' demand and unit
operating costs. Therefore, we identify three cases: I affects only
ﬁrms' demand (referred to as Case A); I affects only ﬁrms' unit op-
erating costs (Case B); I affects both (Case C). In the interest of length,
we investigate cases A and B as implications for Case C can be de-
rived from these two.
We assume that the two ﬁrms are identical in that they face
symmetric demand and incur identical unit operating costs,
namely = =c c ci j . This also implies that, ceteris paribus, the joint
expenditure provides the same beneﬁt to the identical ﬁrms. We
make standard economic assumptions regarding demand and cost
functions.4 We also assume that the effects of the competitive
3 Ceteris paribus, the effect of I on ﬁrms' demand and/or unit operating costs
positively reﬂects on total welfare.
4 Speciﬁcally, each ﬁrm's direct (inverse) demand function is decreasing and
convex in its own price and increasing in the opponent's price (decreasing in both
its own and opponent's quantities). Moreover, each ﬁrm's demand (unit operating
cost) is increasing (decreasing) and concave (convex) in I. The effect of pi on ﬁrm ′i s
demand, i¼1,2, is higher than that of pj, i.e., ( ) ( )>∂ ∂
∂
∂
qi pi pj I
pi
qi pi pj I
pj
, ,
,
, ,
,
( ) ( )>∂ ∂
∂
∂
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
pi qi qj I
qi
pi qi qj I
qj
, ,
,
, ,
,
for inverse demand function), at least at the symmetric
equilibrium under all cost-sharing mechanisms. Due to symmetry, this also implies
that the total demand is decreasing in both prices, i.e.,
( ) ( )>∂ ∂
∂
∂
qi pi pj I
pi
qj pj pi I
pi
, ,
,
, ,
,
,
i¼1,2. Finally, we have veriﬁed that in the range where our equilibrium solutions
arise, proﬁt functions are concave in the decision variables under all cost-sharing
mechanisms. This veriﬁcation can be made available from the authors.
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variable and the joint expenditure on the demand function are
additively separable.5 Consistent with most of the related litera-
ture, we assume a deterministic and complete information sce-
nario to focus on the competitive effects of cost-sharing mechan-
isms. Under both Bertrand and Cournot competition, Mi indicates
ﬁrm i' s proﬁt gross of the joint expenditure, i.e., ( )= −M p c qi i i.
Firms commit to share the joint expenditure based on a se-
lected cost-sharing mechanism. Let ( )φ ≥y y I, , 0i i j be the share of I
allocated to ﬁrm i. In general, it is a function of the competitive
variables yi, yj (prices or quantities), and I. Similarly, ( )φ ≥y y I, , 0j j i
is the share allocated to ﬁrm j. We assume
( ) ( )φ φ+ =y y I y y I, , , , 1i i j j j i to ensure perfect budget balance. We
consider two simple outcome-based mechanisms, namely pro-
portional to marketed quantity (QP), i.e., ( )φ = +y y I, ,i i j qq qii j , and
proportional to total margin (TM), i.e., ( )φ = +y y I, ,i i j MM Mii j . We
compare these two mechanisms with the ﬁxed share mechanism
(FS), i.e., ( )φ φ=y y I, ,i i j and ( )φ φ= −y y I, , 1j j i , where the share is
negotiated via ex ante Nash bargaining. We also derive the optimal
cost-sharing mechanism and compare it with the FS mechanism in
terms of total welfare. These mechanisms ensure perfect budget
balance. Under the FS mechanism, price, quantity, and joint ex-
penditure decisions are not affected by the share φ. Thus, the value
of φ can be easily obtained via Nash bargaining using backward
procedure. Due to symmetry, Nash bargaining naturally leads
ﬁrms to commit ex ante to the solution φ = 1
2
. While the FS me-
chanism yields equal shares ex ante, the outcome-based me-
chanisms lead ﬁrms to split the joint expenditure equally only ex-
post, i.e., after ﬁrms make decisions and market outcomes are
realized.
Finally, we model cooperation among competitors under both
one-stage and two-stage games. We consider these two scenarios
for two main reasons. First, both one-stage and two-stage games
are plausible in real business settings. The two-stage game reﬂects
more the case of joint expenditures related to R&D or production
capacity, which have usually impact on ﬁrms' proﬁts more in the
long term compared with price or quantity decisions. The one-
stage game is more suitable for joint expenditures pertaining to
more tactical or operational activities such as generic advertising
campaigns, quality assurance, and plant maintenance programs.
Moreover, modeling multiple decisions, e.g., price and service
quality, in a one-stage game is common in both economics and
management literature (Dixit, 1979; Bernstein and Federgruen,
2004; Bass et al., 2005). The second reason relates to model
tractability. Speciﬁcally, the two-stage game easily loses tract-
ability in deriving equilibrium solutions for outcome-based me-
chanisms. In contrast, the one-stage game model is analytically
tractable. Therefore, we develop the full analysis under the one-
stage game. In Section 5, we show with the support of both ana-
lytical derivation and numerical analysis that the main messages
to decision makers remain valid also in the case of a two-stage
game.
4. The one-stage game
In a one-stage game, when I affects both demand and unit cost,
ﬁrm i' s proﬁt under Bertrand competition is:
( ) ( ) ( )( )Π φ= − − ( )p c I q p p I p p I I, , , , . 1i i i i j i i j
On the other hand, under Cournot competition, ﬁrm i' s proﬁt
is:
( )( ) ( ) ( )Π φ= − − ( )p q q I c I q q q I I, , , , . 2i i i j i i i j
Recall that ( )φ φ=y y I, ,i i j and ( )φ φ= = −y y I, , 1j j i when the
FS mechanism is considered in (1) and (2). Under Bertrand
(Cournot) competition, ﬁrm i maximizes its own proﬁt in pi (qi)
given the agreed cost-sharing mechanism. The expenditure I is
instead chosen to maximize the joint proﬁt, i.e., Π Π Π= +tot i j, by
the entity established to handle the cooperation (e.g., a consortium
or a joint venture). According to this one-stage game, the ﬁrst
order condition in I is the same irrespective of the cost-sharing
mechanism adopted by ﬁrms. In turn, we analyze cases A and B.
4.1. Case A: I affects only ﬁrms' demand
In this case, the effect of the joint expenditure is to increase
ﬁrms' demand function, thus ( ) =c I c . Generic advertising cam-
paigns among competitors are an example of this kind of situa-
tions (Krishnamurthy, 2000; Bass et al., 2005; Roma and Perrone,
2010). In turn, we derive the equilibrium conditions when ﬁrms
use different cost-sharing mechanisms under both Bertrand and
Cournot competition. The ﬁrst order conditions in pi (qi) are re-
ported in Table 1 for each cost-sharing mechanism. In addition,
under Bertrand competition, taking the ﬁrst order derivative of the
joint proﬁt in I and setting it equal to zero yield for any mechan-
ism:
( ) ( )Π∂∂ = −
∂
∂ + −
∂
∂ − = ( )I p c
q
I
p c
q
I
1 0. 3
tot
i
i
j
j
Similarly, under Cournot competition, we obtain the following:
Π∂
∂ =
∂
∂ +
∂
∂ − = ( )I
p
I
q
p
I
q 1 0. 4
tot i
i
j
j
Based on the ﬁrst order conditions in Table 1 and in (3) and (4)
we provide our ﬁrst results in terms of price, joint expenditure,
demand, and proﬁt comparison. Proofs of this and subsequent
results can be found in the Appendix. Under both Bertrand and
Cournot competition, we use superscripts FS, QP and TM and re-
move subscripts i and j to indicate the equilibrium solutions, as
they are identical for the two ﬁrms given the symmetry.
Proposition 1.
(i) Under Bertrand competition, price and joint expenditure are
ranked as follows: > ≥p p pQP TM FSand > ≥I I IQP TM FS. Demand
comparison depends on which effect, price or joint expenditure, is
dominant.
(ii) Under Cournot competition, quantity and joint expenditure are
ranked as follows: < ≤q q qQP TM FSand < ≤I I IQP TM FS. Price com-
parison depends on which effect, quantity or joint expenditure, is
dominant.
(iii) Under both Bertrand and Cournot competition, ﬁrms earn higher
proﬁts under the TM mechanism than under the FS mechanism, i.
e., Π Π≥TM FS. Moreover, under ﬁerce competition, ﬁrms earn
higher proﬁts under the QP mechanism than under both TM and
FS mechanisms, i.e., Π Π Π> ≥QP TM FS. In the absence of compe-
tition, Π Π Π= >TM FS QP .
5 Additive separability ensures that
( ) ( )= =∂ ∂ ∂
∂
∂ ∂
qi pi pj I
I pi
qj pj pi I
I pi
2 , ,
,
2 , ,
,( ) ( )= =∂ ∂ ∂
∂
∂ ∂ 0
qj pj pi I
I pj
qi pi pj I
I pj
2 , ,
,
2 , ,
,
hold under Bertrand competition. Similar conditions
can be derived under Cournot competition. This assumption affects only joint ex-
penditure comparison under Bertrand competition and case A. We considered the
multiplicative demand function as a representative case where additive separ-
ability does not hold and showed that the major ﬁndings of this paper still prevail.
The proofs are available from the authors.
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Proposition 1 conﬁrms that outcome-based cost-sharing me-
chanisms (QP and TM) work as mechanisms to reduce market
competition among ﬁrms irrespective of the type of competition.
Speciﬁcally, under Bertrand (Cournot) competition, the use of
outcome-based mechanisms tends to raise marginal costs as
compared with the FS mechanism. This is because the cost of the
joint expenditure is directly connected to the produced quantity
under outcome-based mechanisms. In turn, this yields higher
(lower) prices (quantities) when ﬁrms utilize such mechanisms.
However, the effect of outcome-based mechanisms might not be
always socially detrimental as the strategic interaction between
the joint expenditure and the competitive variable differs across
different cost-sharing mechanisms and different types of
competition.
Under Cournot competition, the lower output marketed by
ﬁrms when they use outcome-based cost-sharing mechanisms (QP
and TM) results in a lower level of the joint expenditure as com-
pared with the case of the more competitive FS mechanism. As a
result, in the one stage-game the total welfare is always lower
under outcome-based mechanisms. This is because the total wel-
fare is directly affected only by the level of produced quantities
and the level of the joint expenditure. This ﬁnding supports the
conventional argument that the introduction of outcome-based
cost-sharing mechanisms tends to lower ﬁnal quantities and
welfare.
Under Bertrand competition, the effect of using outcome-based
cost-sharing mechanisms is quite different. The higher price im-
plies a higher joint expenditure when QP and TM mechanisms are
used, instead of the FS mechanism. Therefore, there also exists a
positive effect of limiting competition via outcome-based me-
chanisms as a demand-increasing joint expenditure is beneﬁcial
from a welfare perspective. Because of the presence of tension
between positive and negative effects, it is unknown in general
whether total welfare is higher or lower when ﬁrms use outcome-
based mechanisms. Consequently, concerns against such me-
chanisms may or may not be an issue as welfare comparison de-
pends on which factor, i.e., joint expenditure or price, has higher
inﬂuence on ﬁrms' demand. This ambiguity will be unraveled in
Section 4.1.1 under speciﬁc demand function.
Proposition 1 provides general results on how cost-sharing
mechanisms affect ﬁrms' proﬁtability. Speciﬁcally, the TM me-
chanism always leads to a higher proﬁt than the FS mechanism.
However, the comparisons involving the QP mechanism are am-
biguous under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. In the
presence of ﬁerce competition the QP mechanism leads to higher
proﬁt than the other two mechanisms. When the level of com-
petition decreases, both TM and FS mechanisms may or may not
lead to a higher proﬁt than the QP mechanism. When competition
is absent, the QP mechanism is dominated by the FS mechanism,
which is equivalent to the TM mechanism. The rationale is that,
when competition is low or totally absent, the use of QP leads to
unnecessary overpricing or underselling. As a result, the use of QP
may end up lowering ﬁrms' proﬁts to such an extent that other
cost-sharing mechanisms will dominate. In Section 4.1.1, we better
characterize the proﬁt comparison using a speciﬁc demand
function.
These results have important practical implications. First, ﬁrms
should be aware of the impact that different cost-sharing me-
chanisms have on operational decisions, e.g., price or quantity. In
particular, ﬁrms should expect that outcome-based mechanisms
will lead them to raise (lower) prices (quantities) as compared
with the FS mechanism when they compete à là Bertrand (Cour-
not). Second, ﬁrms should expect that outcome-based mechan-
isms will lead them to increase (decrease) the joint expenditure as
compared with the FS mechanism when they compete on prices
(quantities). This implies that outcome-based mechanisms are
likely to increase the joint expenditure in settings such as retail co-
ops or manufacturing cooperation on single end-user products (e.
g., Toyota-PSA alliance), where competition tends to be on prices.
In contrast, outcome-based mechanisms may be detrimental in
terms of joint expenditure in settings such as commodity co-
operatives, as ﬁrms positioned upstream in the supply chain are
more likely to compete on quantities. Third, our proﬁt comparison
has implications for those contexts of stable cooperation, such as
agrifood cooperatives, retail buying groups, and durable R&D or
manufacturing alliances (e.g., PSA-Toyota alliance), where ﬁrms
often adopt a QP cost allocation scheme. Speciﬁcally, it suggests
that even sharing joint expenditures on an ex ante basis instead of
using the QP mechanism may guarantee higher proﬁts to ﬁrms if
competition is mild or there is no competition at all. Therefore,
from a practical perspective, ﬁrms should carefully look at the
competition level before making their choices on cost-sharing
mechanisms. They should consider opting for the QP mechanism if
competition among competitors is ﬁerce. Otherwise, they may
consider the TM mechanism if implementable, or the FS me-
chanism. Naturally, ﬁrms' decisions on cost-sharing mechanisms
should be inﬂuenced by welfare considerations. The adoption of
outcome-based mechanisms may come under lens of authorities if
they are detrimental in terms of total welfare. The above results
inform that outcome-based mechanisms have a negative effect on
Table 1
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total welfare under Cournot competition in the one-stage game. In
contrast, when ﬁrms compete on prices, welfare implications are
not straightforward, as we will discuss in Section 4.1.1.
Before we resolve the ambiguity about the effect of outcome-
based mechanisms on total welfare, we present the optimal cost-
sharing mechanism under Bertrand competition. The optimal
mechanism is later utilized for welfare comparison with the FS
mechanism. The case of Cournot competition can be similarly
derived.
Proposition 2. Under Bertrand competition, the optimal cost-shar-
ing mechanism is for =i 1, 2and = −j i3 :
( )φ = = = ≠ ≠
≠ =
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
p p I
if p p p or if p p p p
if p p p
, ,
,
1
i i j
i j
opt
i
opt
j
opt
i j
opt
1
2
where popt solves the total collusive proﬁt maximization problem in p:
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
* * * *
− ( ) − ( )
− ( ) − ( ) ≥ − ( ) − ( ) = 5
p c q p p I p I p
s t
p c q p p I p I p p c q p p I p I p i
max 2 , ,
. .
, ,
2
max , , 1, 2
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pi i i
with *( )I p chosen to maximize the total collusive proﬁt, i.e.,
( ) ( )− −p c q p p I I2 , , .
The optimal cost-sharing mechanism should naturally lead
ﬁrms to agree upon the collusive price, i.e., =p popt coll, as it max-
imizes ﬁrms' total proﬁt. However, =p popt coll might not always
hold in a setting where ( ) ( )φ φ+ =p p I p p I, , , , 1i i j j j i . In fact, in the
presence of low impact of the joint expenditure on the demand
function, there might be an incentive for ﬁrms to deviate from the
fully collusive outcome even at the cost of footing the entire bill.6
In this case, the collusive price is not credible. Therefore, popt has to
be set in a way that ﬁrms are indifferent between the agreed price
and deviation. That is, the incentive compatibility constraints in
(5) have to be satisﬁed at equality. In this case, ﬁrms make ob-
viously lower proﬁt than under full collusion, but still higher than
under any other cost-sharing mechanism. As cost allocation de-
pends on a market outcome (the price), the optimal cost-sharing
mechanism is de facto an outcome-based mechanism.
Under Bertrand competition, the optimal cost-sharing me-
chanism can yield higher joint expenditure than the other me-
chanisms due to the higher price ﬁrms can charge using such
mechanism.7 In the one-stage game, the same result never holds
when ﬁrms compete on quantities. Indeed, in this case, the opti-
mal mechanism leads ﬁrms to produce the lowest quantity. This
yields the lowest level of joint expenditure and thus the lowest
total welfare as compared with the other mechanisms.
4.1.1. Comparison under quasi-linear demand
We consider the case of quasi-linear demand to better illustrate
our general ﬁndings and explore the effect of outcome-based
mechanisms on total welfare. Firms' direct demand functions are
derived from the well-known quadratic consumer's utility func-
tion (Singh and Vives, 1984):
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )= +− + − − +
−
− ( )
U q q K r I
a b
q q a
a b
q q
b
a b
q q
,
2
,
6
1 2 1 2 2 2 1
2
2
2
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to which the amount of purchased quantities times respective
prices, i.e., +p q p q1 1 2 2, is subtracted to obtain the consumer sur-
plus. Therefore, ﬁrm i's direct demand function is:
( ) = + − + = = − ( )q p p I K r I ap bp i j i, , 1, 2 3 , 7i i j i j
where >K 0, >r 0, > ≥a b 0. Note that K is the market base of
each ﬁrm before the joint expenditure is made, whereas r is a
measure of the effectiveness of the joint expenditure in increasing
the representative consumer's utility, and thus the market base of
each ﬁrm. Furthermore, a reﬂects consumers' price sensitivity,
whereas b reﬂects the degree of product substitutability, and thus
the degree of price competition in the market. The square root
reﬂects the usual diminishing rate of returns of the joint ex-
penditure. In the Cournot competition case, the inverse demand
function can be straightforwardly derived from (7). Note that the
quasi-linear demand function satisﬁes the assumption of separ-
able-additivity. The equilibrium solutions for all cost-sharing me-
chanisms (including the optimal one) are reported in the Appen-
dix under both Bertrand and Cournot competition (Tables A1 and
A2, respectively).8 The next proposition makes the results pre-
sented in Proposition 1 more explicit and sheds light on total
welfare comparison.
Proposition 3. When direct demand functions are as in (7),
(i) under both Bertrand and Cournot competition ﬁrms earn higher
proﬁts under the QP mechanism than under both TM and FS
mechanisms if b is sufﬁciently high or r is sufﬁciently low.
Otherwise, the QP mechanism leads to lower proﬁts than TM or
both TM and FS mechanisms;
(ii) under Bertrand competition, ﬁrms always sell more under the FS
mechanism. However, the total welfare is higher under the op-
timal and TM mechanisms than under the FS mechanism if r is
sufﬁciently high. Moreover, the total welfare is higher under the
QP mechanism than under the FS mechanism if r and b are suf-
ﬁciently high;
(iii) under Cournot competition, ﬁrms always set a lower price under
the FS mechanism. Moreover, the total welfare is always higher
when ﬁrms use such mechanism instead of the QP, TM, and op-
timal cost-sharing mechanisms.
The threshold conditions in b and r are provided in the Ap-
pendix due to their complex expressions. Proposition 3 further
clariﬁes the regions of parameters where ﬁrms' proﬁts are higher
when using the QP mechanism rather than TM and FS mechan-
isms. Speciﬁcally, this occurs in a highly competitive environment
(high values of b) or when the possibility to increase market de-
mand is limited (low values of r). This is because in such types of
environment the signiﬁcant sales restriction guaranteed by the QP
mechanism considerably increases ﬁrms' proﬁts. However, when
competition is mild and the effectiveness of the joint expenditure
is sufﬁciently high, the QP mechanism leads to excessive over-
pricing (or underselling). As a result, in this case ﬁrms earn higher
proﬁts when using TM and FS mechanisms. Fig. 1 provides a re-
presentative example of these results (and relative threshold
6 If side payments were allowed, i.e., if ( ) ( )φ φ+p p I p p I, , , ,i i j j j i could also be
higher than 1, there would not be perfect budget balance so that the deviating ﬁrm
could be forced to pay more than the entire amount of the joint expenditure, for
instance, by transferring additional money to the ﬁrm that does not deviate. In this
case, the collusive outcome would always be implementable.
7 As shown in the Appendix, due to the higher price, the optimal mechanism
certainly leads to a higher joint expenditure than TM and FS mechanisms. However,
it may or may not result in a higher joint expenditure as compared with QP as it
may or may not lead to higher price than QP. In fact, when the collusive price is
implementable, the QP mechanism might lead to a higher price than the optimal
mechanism if competition is mild or absent.
8 Note that, as also reported in the Appendix, under symmetry, the equilibrium
consumer surplus is simply the squared equilibrium quantity divided by −a b for
all cost-sharing mechanisms and all economic settings considered in the paper.
Therefore, the comparison of consumer surplus strictly follows from demand
comparison.
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conditions). In particular, plots 1a and 1c show how the proﬁt
percentage differences between FS and QP mechanisms and be-
tween TM and QP mechanisms vary with the effectiveness of the
joint expenditure for different levels of price competition b. Our
results on proﬁt comparison are consistent with the industry
evidence that the QP mechanism is usually observed in saturated
markets (low values of r) and/or in markets where ﬁrms ﬁercely
compete to increase their proﬁts. This is the case of agrifood and
retail cooperatives, which usually operate in mature markets, or
the alliance Toyota–PSA, which jointly produces three city-car
models for the highly competitive European automobile market. In
contrast, in case of R&D cooperation for new-to-the-world pro-
ducts or technologies, joint expenditures are usually highly effec-
tive and (at least in initial stages of the product lifecycle) there is
no need of head-to-head competition as ﬁrms have at disposal a
large market potential to exploit. In this case, the QP mechanism
should never be preferred to the FS mechanism. Consistent with
our result, the FS mechanism is often used in these contexts (e.g.,
Intel-Micron and Samsung-Sony joint ventures), where the difﬁ-
culty to observe proﬁt margins of each partner of the cooperation
may make the TM mechanism not implementable.
It is a common argument that the higher proﬁt under outcome-
based mechanisms comes at the expense of a lower total welfare.
In contrast, Proposition 3 shows that under Bertrand competition,
such mechanisms, and even full collusion induced by the optimal
cost-sharing mechanism, can generate higher total welfare as
compared with the more competitive FS mechanism. This can
occur when the joint expenditure effectiveness is sufﬁciently high.
However, when comparing QP and FS mechanisms, a high level of
competition is also necessary for the former to yield higher total
welfare than the latter.9 These results (and relative threshold
conditions) are also exempliﬁed in Fig. 1. Speciﬁcally, plots 1b and
1d show how the welfare percentage differences between out-
come-based mechanisms and the FS mechanism vary with the
effectiveness of the joint expenditure for different levels of price
competition b.
When ﬁrms compete à là Cournot, our results under the one-
stage game support the conventional belief that outcome-based
mechanisms are detrimental to society. The different result stems
from the fact that under Bertrand competition ﬁrms do not reduce
the level of the joint expenditure when using an outcome-based
mechanism. Rather, a higher price implies a higher joint ex-
penditure under outcome-based mechanisms. A higher joint ex-
penditure is beneﬁcial to society and the relative impact increases
with r. For large values of r, the effect of the joint expenditure on
total welfare becomes more relevant than the negative effect of a
more collusive price setting. In this case, the use of outcome-based
cost-sharing mechanisms instead of the more competitive FS
mechanism is welfare-enhancing because it helps soften market
Fig. 1. Proﬁt and total welfare percentage differences among different cost-sharing mechanisms under Bertrand competition, Case A and quasi-linear demand: in 1a and 1b
values of parameters are K¼1, c¼0.1, a¼0.5, b¼0.08; in 1c and 1d values of parameters are K¼1, c¼0.1, a¼0.5, b¼0.2. The comparisons are carried within the range of
parameters that ensure sensible equilibria for all cost-sharing mechanisms.
9 It is noteworthy that, in such a range, the QP mechanism also leads to higher
proﬁts than the FS mechanism.
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competition. In turn, this helps maintain higher prices in the ﬁnal
market and thus fuels the joint expenditure. Hence, the funda-
mental intuition behind our important result on total welfare is
related to the different strategic interactions between the joint
expenditure and the competitive variable under different cost-
sharing mechanisms.
These ﬁndings provide a richer picture of the role of outcome-
based mechanisms on total welfare as compared with previous
studies (Grossman and Shapiro, 1986; Katz, 1986; Katz et al., 1990).
While arguments in the previous literature have usually suggested
that outcome-based mechanisms hurt the total welfare, we show
that they can actually be beneﬁcial to society under Bertrand
competition when the joint expenditure has a large impact on
ﬁrms' demand. Our results on total welfare comparison can be
useful to competing ﬁrms engaging in cooperation as well as an-
titrust authorities. These actors should be aware that outcome-
based mechanisms can offer an incentive to ﬁrms to raise the level
of welfare-enhancing expenditures and thus the total welfare
when decisions are simultaneous (i.e., the one-stage game applies)
and competition is on prices. Thus, ﬁrms should not be prevented
from using outcome-based mechanisms if this helps them to in-
crease welfare-enhancing expenditures considerably. This could be
the case of producers of products with geographical indications (e.
g., Italian parmesan and German Black Forest ham) that create
consortia for product protection, promotion, and inter-
nationalization, while remaining competitors in the market. These
producers usually adopt outcome-based allocation mechanisms to
ﬁnance their joint activities. In the case of marketing campaigns
for product internationalization, the use of outcome-based me-
chanisms can be beneﬁcial in terms of total welfare as more
consumers become informed about the products. However, if ﬁrms
use outcome-based mechanisms to raise prices without ade-
quately supporting welfare-enhancing joint expenditures, anti-
trust authorities should raise serious concerns. There have been
several cases where these producers were investigated for re-
stricting competition in their national markets (OECD, 2000). In
Section 5, we show that outcome-based mechanisms can be more
beneﬁcial in terms of total welfare than the FS mechanism also
under Cournot competition.
4.2. Case B: I affects only ﬁrms' unit operating cost
In this case the joint expenditure reduces ﬁrms' unit operating
costs, thus ( ) ( )=q p p I q p p, , ,i j i j . Joint expenditures for plant
maintenance service or quality control programs in co-manu-
facturing agreements are examples of this kind of situations. The
derivation of equilibrium solutions is similar to Case A. The ﬁrst
order conditions in pi (qi) for each cost-sharing mechanism are the
same as those in Table 1, where now ( )=c c I . Under both Bertrand
and Cournot competition, taking the ﬁrst order derivative of the
joint proﬁt in I and setting it equal to zero yield the following for
any mechanism:
( )Π∂∂ = −
∂
∂ + − = ( )I
c
I
q q 1 0. 8
tot
i j
With the support of the ﬁrst order conditions in Table 1 and in
(8), we provide the results of comparison under Case B in the next
proposition.
Proposition 4. Under both Bertrand and Cournot competition,
(i) price, quantity and joint expenditure are ranked as follows:
> ≥p p pQP TM FS, < ≤q q qQP TM FS, and < ≤I I IQP TM FS;
(ii) ﬁrms earn higher proﬁts under the TM mechanism than under
the FS mechanism, i.e., Π Π≥TM FS. Under ﬁerce competition, ﬁrms
earn higher proﬁts under the QP mechanism than under both TM
and FS mechanisms, i.e., Π Π Π> ≥QP TM FS . In the absence of
competition, Π Π Π= >TM FS QP .
Proposition 4 suggests that the collusive effect of outcome-
based cost-sharing mechanisms (QP and TM) on the joint ex-
penditure is always negative. With simultaneous decisions, ﬁrms
and antitrust bodies can certainly expect lower total welfare when
the joint expenditure is cost-reducing. This is because the lower
produced quantity implies a lower level of the joint expenditure as
well as a higher price under both Bertrand and Cournot compe-
tition. Under Bertrand competition, the underlying difference with
Case A is that here the optimal level of the joint expenditure is
directly driven by the quantity rather than the price. The lower
quantity under outcome-based mechanisms provides ﬁrms with
the incentive to spend less to improve operational efﬁciency. Thus,
the ﬁndings in Proposition 4 are in line with the argument usually
provided by previous literature. Firms should be aware that out-
come-based mechanisms are welfare-reducing when decisions are
simultaneous (i.e., the one-stage game applies) and the joint ex-
penditure has the purpose of reducing unit operating costs. The
results on how sharing mechanisms affect ﬁrms' proﬁtability are
qualitatively identical to those presented in Proposition 1. There-
fore, the same considerations apply to Case B as well.
The optimal cost-sharing mechanism can be determined as in
Proposition 2 for both Bertrand and Cournot competition. Thus, we
omit the proposition for this result. In the interest of length, we
also omit the example with a possible speciﬁcation of demand and
cost functions because welfare comparison under the general
model is not ambiguous. Moreover, proﬁt comparisons qualita-
tively lead to the same results as those presented in Proposition 3.
Therefore, the analysis is provided only in the Appendix. In this
case, the direct demand function is derived from (6) where the
joint expenditure term is removed to study the impact on cost. The
unit operating cost function is as follows:
( ) = − ( )c I c r I . 9
The above function is decreasing and convex in the joint ex-
penditure. Here, r measures the effectiveness of the joint ex-
penditure in reducing unit operating cost. The square root reﬂects
the usual diminishing rate of returns of the joint expenditure.
5. The two-stage game
In this section, we tackle the two-stage game with the support
of both analytical derivation and numerical analysis to show that
the main results of the paper are robust irrespective of the timing
of decisions. Recall that in the two-stage game, the sequence of
decisions is as follows. The joint expenditure is decided by the
entity established to manage the cooperation (e.g., a consortium or
a joint venture) in the ﬁrst stage. Then in the second stage, ﬁrms
compete in setting prices or quantities and share the realized
proﬁts according to the selected cost-sharing mechanism.
Analytically we can only compare the FS mechanism and the
optimal cost-sharing mechanism under the demand function in
(7) and the cost function in (9). This helps verify whether the
ﬁnding that the optimal mechanism leads to higher total welfare
in case of Bertrand competition remains valid also under the two-
stage game. The ﬁrst order conditions for prices and quantities in
the second stage are identical to those derived in the one-stage
game in Table 1. However, the ﬁrst order conditions in I are dif-
ferent from those derived in the one-stage game as now the co-
operative expenditure is chosen in the ﬁrst stage. This implies that
the FS mechanism yields different equilibrium solutions as com-
pared with the one-stage game. Such equilibrium solutions are
reported in the Appendix (Tables A5 and A6) under both Bertrand
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and Cournot competition. In contrast, the optimal cost-sharing
mechanism still leads to the same solutions as those in the one-
stage game (Tables A1, A2, A3 and A4). Next, we present the
comparison.
Proposition 5.
(i) Under Bertrand competition, Case A and demand function as in
(7): Price (demand) is always higher (lower) under the optimal
cost-sharing mechanism. The joint expenditure is higher under
the optimal cost-sharing mechanism if r is sufﬁciently high and b
assumes relatively low values. Finally, total welfare is higher
under the optimal cost-sharing mechanism if r is sufﬁciently high
and b assumes intermediate values.
(ii) Under Bertrand competition, Case B, demand function derived
from (7)and cost function as in (9): The joint expenditure is
always higher under the optimal cost-sharing mechanism. More-
over, demand (price) is higher (lower) under the optimal cost-
sharing mechanism if r assumes intermediate values and b is
sufﬁciently high. Finally, total welfare is higher under the optimal
cost-sharing mechanism if both r and b are sufﬁciently high.
(iii) Under Cournot competition, both Cases A and B, demand function
as in (7)and cost function as in (9): The joint expenditure is
always higher under the optimal cost-sharing mechanism. Quan-
tity (price) is always higher (lower) under the FS mechanism.
Moreover, the total welfare is always higher under the FS
mechanism than under the optimal cost-sharing mechanism.
Again, the threshold conditions in b and r are provided in the
Appendix due to their complex expressions. Proposition 5 con-
ﬁrms and further strengthens the insight that under certain con-
ditions even ﬁrms' collusion on price might be socially preferred to
the more competitive FS mechanism. In the presence of price
competition, the optimal mechanism can lead to higher total
welfare than the FS mechanism not only under Case A, but also
under Case B. The rationale is that in contrast to the one-stage
game, ﬁrms have the incentive to jointly spend more in the ﬁrst
stage under the optimal mechanism given that they can anticipate
higher proﬁt in the second stage due to collusion.
Under Cournot competition, the interaction between the joint
expenditure and the quantity differs from that in the one-stage
game. The possibility to enjoy more collusive proﬁts creates a
larger incentive to spend in the ﬁrst stage. As a result, a lower
output leads to a higher joint expenditure. Nevertheless, there is
no beneﬁt in terms of welfare. The reason is that the collusion in
the second stage depresses the marketed output to such an extent
that the positive effect of a higher joint expenditure is not able to
compensate for the negative effect of such a lower quantity.
We also conducted an extensive numerical analysis to consider
QP and TM mechanisms, which are not tractable under the two-
stage game. In our numerical analysis the demand function is
derived from (7), whereas the cost function is derived from (9).
Fig. 2. Proﬁt and total welfare percentage differences among different cost-sharing mechanisms under Cournot competition, Case B and quasi-linear demand and speciﬁc
cost function: in 2a and 2b values of parameters are K¼1, c¼1.5, a¼0.5, b¼0.01; in 2c and 2d values of parameters are K¼1, c¼4, a¼0.5, b¼0.37. The comparisons are
carried out within the range of parameters that ensure sensible equilibria for all cost-sharing mechanisms. Also, note that a value of c higher than K is sensible as long as K"
(a"b)c is positive.
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The comparisons were carried out in the range of parameters
ensuring sensible equilibrium for all mechanisms. The main results
regarding proﬁt comparison are qualitatively identical to those
obtained in the one-stage game. Thus, we only discuss the ﬁndings
about total welfare comparison. At any rate, Fig. 2 provides re-
presentative examples of our results by showing proﬁt and welfare
percentage differences among different mechanisms.
The numerical analysis allows us to make a further crucial
point. The beneﬁcial effect of outcome-based mechanisms is not
restricted to the case of Bertrand competition. Our numerical re-
sults indeed reveal that the total welfare can be higher under both
TM and QP mechanisms than under the FS mechanism also in the
presence of Cournot competition (both Cases A and B). This occurs
when quantity competition is sufﬁciently high and the joint ex-
penditure is highly effective. In addition, when competition is very
ﬁerce, the total welfare is higher under both TM and QP me-
chanisms than under the FS mechanism even in the presence of
mildly effective joint expenditure. These results are exempliﬁed in
Fig. 2 (2b and 2d). The intuition behind the different welfare result
compared with the one-stage game is related to a different stra-
tegic interaction between the joint expenditure and the quantity.
Under sequential decisions a lower output does not imply a lower
joint expenditure under outcome-based mechanisms. Rather, a
lower output in the second stage leads to a higher joint ex-
penditure in the ﬁrst stage because ﬁrms can anticipate higher
proﬁts when competition is restricted. The collusive power of QP
and TM mechanisms is lower than that of the optimal mechanism
so that the reduction of produced output is not large enough. As a
result, when both quantity competition and effectiveness of the
joint expenditure are sufﬁciently high (or simply when quantity
competition is extremely ﬁerce), the beneﬁt of a higher joint ex-
penditure more than outweighs the negative effect of reduced
output. In this case, the use of the QP and TM mechanisms instead
of the more competitive FS mechanism can increase total welfare,
even though favoring collusion. Either QP or TM mechanisms can
prevail depending on the range of parameters.
Under Bertrand competition (both Cases A and B), numerical
analysis shows that both QP and TM mechanisms can be more
beneﬁcial than the FS mechanism in terms of total welfare when
price competition and effectiveness of the cooperative ex-
penditure are sufﬁciently high, or when price competition is very
ﬁerce. From Proposition 5, recall that the optimal cost-sharing
mechanism can also lead to a higher total welfare than the FS
mechanism. Numerical investigation seems to suggest that the QP
and TM mechanisms are even more beneﬁcial.
Overall, the analysis under a two-stage game helps strengthen
the ﬁndings derived under the one-stage game. In terms of ﬁrms'
proﬁtability, the analysis suggests that results are qualitatively
unchanged. Firms should prefer the QP mechanism in highly
competitive markets and/or when demand tends to saturation and
technology is mature (for instance, food industry or city-car seg-
ment in Europe). In contrast, even the FS mechanism could be
preferred to the QP mechanism in new-to-the-world markets with
initially moderate competition (e.g., LCD technology at the time of
joint venture establishment between Sony and Samsung). As for
the total welfare, the two-stage game analysis suggests that not
only under Bertrand but also under Cournot competition, ﬁrms'
choice of using outcome-based mechanisms can yield higher total
welfare when competition and effectiveness of the joint ex-
penditure are sufﬁciently high. This result can occur even in case
of mild effectiveness of the joint expenditure if competition is
extremely ﬁerce. Also, with sequential decisions (e.g., R&D or
manufacturing capacity decisions) the positive welfare beneﬁts of
adopting outcome-based mechanisms can arise irrespective of
whether the joint expenditure is demand-increasing or cost-re-
ducing. Thus, our analysis informs ﬁrms and antitrust bodies that
the conventional belief that outcome-based mechanisms facilitate
ﬁrms' collusion at the detriment of the society might be erroneous
in the presence of highly competitive markets, which are far from
demand and/or technology maturity.
We have also performed extensive numerical analyses con-
sidering the case of non-identical ﬁrms (e.g., ﬁrms differing in
market base or unit operating cost) under both one and two stage
games. The comparison with non-identical ﬁrms is indeed not
tractable analytically. Nevertheless, the numerical study shows
that our major ﬁndings are robust even in the presence of asym-
metry. In the interest of length, the results of this study are
omitted and can be made available from the authors.
6. Industry implications and conclusions
Firms consider the opportunity to cooperate and share costs of
expenditures/investments with competitors in numerous business
settings. In this paper we have studied the economic consequences
of using outcome-based vs. ex ante-based mechanisms in a variety
of settings, i.e., Bertrand and Cournot competition, demand-in-
creasing and cost-reducing expenditure, and one and two stage
games.
There are two essential messages conveyed by this paper that
can be useful to support ﬁrms' and antitrust bodies' decisions.
First, outcome-based cost-sharing mechanisms might actually
have the merit of increasing total welfare as compared with the
more competitive ﬁxed share mechanism, even though favoring
full collusion. We have shown that outcome-based mechanisms
can indeed yield higher total welfare in the presence of simulta-
neous decisions under Bertrand competition and demand-in-
creasing joint expenditure. In the presence of sequential decisions,
they can yield higher total welfare under both Bertrand and
Cournot competition, irrespective of whether the joint ex-
penditure is demand-increasing or cost-reducing. Therefore, our
ﬁndings may lead to reconsider the conventional stance on the
role of such mechanisms. In fact, the antitrust guidelines on hor-
izontal inter-ﬁrm cooperation in the US and EU are stringent when
cooperative agreements serve as mechanisms to implement mar-
ket collusion. For instance, in the US antitrust guidelines, it is ex-
plicitly pointed out that anticompetitive harms could result if co-
operating competitors utilize mechanisms that raise their mar-
ginal costs in the ﬁnal market. The outcome-based cost-sharing
mechanisms have been traditionally identiﬁed as examples of such
kind in previous literature. However, our results suggest that al-
though outcome-based mechanisms should always be carefully
scrutinized, they should not be discouraged under certain cir-
cumstances as they can have positive effects in terms of total
welfare. From a practical perspective, our study informs ﬁrms and
antitrust bodies that in markets characterized by intense compe-
tition and large room to expand demand and/or improve opera-
tional efﬁciency, the use of outcome-based mechanisms (rather
than that of the FS mechanism) could be favored, provided that
ﬁrms exploit their increased price or quantity-setting power to
adequately fuel welfare-enhancing cooperative expenditure. In
particular, a useful insight for competing ﬁrms aiming at utilizing
outcome-based mechanisms for sharing joint expenditures is to
demonstrate that the increased price or quantity setting power
will be accompanied by adequate welfare-beneﬁcial expenditures.
A useful insight for antitrust bodies and policy makers is to care-
fully scrutinize the type of cooperation (long-term vs. short-term
joint decisions, demand-increasing vs. cost-reducing cooperation)
and the type of competition (Bertrand vs. Cournot). Particularly,
they should measure the extent of price/quantity setting power
increase in relation with the increase in level of joint expenditure
under outcome-based mechanisms. In addition, taxation policies
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for fair re-allocation among ﬁrms and consumers of the higher
beneﬁts possibly derived from using outcome-based mechanisms
should also be considered.
Our second message is that outcome-based cost-sharing me-
chanisms are in general preferable from a proﬁtability perspective.
However, there exist market circumstances where the QP me-
chanism leads to lower proﬁtability than the more competitive FS
mechanism. This result can help increase ﬁrms' awareness about
the economic implications of using the QP mechanism. Firms
should opt for the QP mechanism in business settings where
competition is intense, such as the case of the European city-car
market targeted by the alliance Toyota–PSA. Similarly, the QP
mechanism should be preferred when demand or technology is
mature, which may be the case of agrifood and retail cooperatives
in US and Europe. This is because this mechanism helps soften the
competition better than the other mechanisms. In contrast, in the
case of R&D cooperation for new-to-the-world products and mild
competition, the QP mechanism should never be preferred by both
TM and FS mechanisms. In such contexts, the excessive over-
pricing or underselling caused by the QP mechanism prevents
ﬁrms from taking advantage of the large room available to expand
demand or improve operational efﬁciency by means of the joint
expenditure.
In conclusion, we present some ideas for future research. In this
paper, we have deﬁned the cooperation in the form of a joint ex-
penditure. However, future research may consider revenue-shar-
ing agreements, which are popular in the airline industry (Chen et
al., 2014). We expect that the main results presented in this paper
still hold if we model cooperation in the form of revenue-sharing.
Similarly, the extension to more than two competitors should not
affect the ﬁndings of this paper. However, in this case, if the
creation of subcoalitions (instead of the grand-coalition with all
ﬁrms) were allowed, a completely different analysis would be
required. This is because the effect of the joint expenditure on
ﬁrms' demand and/or unit operating costs may depend on the
number of members of a certain subcoalition. An analysis along
this direction is undoubtedly worth further work.
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in
the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.08.002.
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